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Abstract
Social systems are more complex than phys-
ical systems but systems theory and cyber-
netics are not extensible by adding local re-
finements as an incremental science. By gen-
eral systems theory we would expect living
systems to exhibit the same fundamentals
as physical systems that can be expressed in
logical terms, that is the language of mathe-
matics, science and philosophy built on logic.
As the complexity of systems increases so the
theory has to dig deeper into these logical
foundations to guarantee a rigorous applica-
tion of its principles. This applies to the sys-
tems of human life to be found in biology and
medicine, economics and social systems, that
is if they are to have the power of the exact
sciences. Human life resides in a myriad of
connections at various levels. Possible inter-
actions between levels lead to a more pro-
found type of logic because the closed world
assumption no longer holds at any level. It is
necessary therefore to go back to first prin-
ciples even to the work of Go¨del (1906-1978)
on incompleteness and undecidability for a
natural logic. Social systems do not popu-
late a Boolean world but a topos where the
internal logic is Heyting.
1 Introduction
If ever there was a time for a theory to return to its
roots - it is now for systems theory and cybernetics
to make a rigorous examination of their logical foun-
dations. The behaviour and control of interest are
no longer simple in systems of the modern world. The
study of how a system behaves from its parts is reason-
ing at a local level which is expressible in the first order
predicate logic of classical mathematics which Go¨del
showed in his doctoral thesis [8] to be complete, that is
internally consistent. This has proved very adequate
for much science and engineering of the last century
often by appealing to very clever models that approx-
imated to first order predicate logic. This method has
worked well in the past when the systems under ex-
amination were in general closed and the logic was
that of a closed Boolean world. While the work of the
early pioneers in systems theory and cybernetics like
Ashby, von Bertalanffy and Wiener was well known
and respected by the science community, nevertheless
the mainstream was able to do quite well, thank you,
without resorting to holistic concepts. Indeed there
has been a lurking suspicion that the holism of sys-
tems theory has a touch of mysticism about it, which
is not proper science and more like religion. Today
applied science has shifted down into things like nan-
otechnology and across into intangibles like informa-
tion science and how humans behave, none of which is
any longer within the easy ambit of classical physics.
Society and medical science are concerned not just
with interoperating parts of a system but with the
relationship between parts and the system as a whole
and with interoperability between systems through in-
creasing globalisation, including between parts of one
system and parts of another system. The major differ-
ence is that these systems have to be treated as open
[26] and therefore not conveniently accessible by first
order predicate logic.
2 Open Holistic Systems
The consequence is that social science can no longer
neglect today this side of systems theory and cyber-
netics. We all have to face up to the challenge even
of that mystical quality and holism and pursue it in
a scientific way. For phenomena like a living being
or consciousness are themselves physical entities upon
which classical methods have been able to make little
progress. The mathematics and physics of life whether
for the individual or groups of individuals have hardly
been touched even within systems theory and certainly
not in mainstream science. The energetic initiation in
consciousness theory in the late 1990s came to almost
nothing beyond that there was a hard problem. Sys-
tems theory suggests that new areas of the human and
medical sciences will not get far without a full under-
standing, not only of entities like life and conscious-
ness but even aspects of social and moral systems like
’conscience’.
Between intra-operability and inter-operability
there has been a gap in causation that is between
the parts and the whole. The mechanism can often
be well described qualitatively but rarely logically be-
yond the rationalisation of a simple Boolean value. A
substance injected into a cell may kill the organism as
a whole but can provide no reason for the outcome.
Scans of the brain may show parts affected but no en-
lightenment of what is going on. As artefacts become
more complicated in their design and manufacture so
they pass from simple objects to heterogeneous sys-
tems. The sequence of single instructions in the von
Neumann computer is now replaced by the parallelism
of an array of coprocessors with interoperating time
domains [18] in modern commercial computers [19].
Human life resides in a myriad of connections at var-
ious levels, locally, nationally and globally. Possible
interactions between levels in social structures lead to
a more profound type of logic because the closed world
assumption no longer holds at any level.
Furthermore systems of human behaviour have to
be integrated from large high level social group ac-
tivity down to the way individual genes and neurons
operate. Examples of the application of quite sophis-
ticated systems at the high level are such as credit risk
between financial institutions, economics of money
laundering, financial crime, global insurance industry,
regulatory governments, international trade, money
and wealth distribution, business activity cycles, trade
competition policies, anti-trust law, full employment,
urbanisation, entrepreneurial activity, health manage-
ment systems, ageing, obesity, intellectual and indus-
trial property rights, and computer security. At the
low level examples can be found in the advances in bio-
engineering and neuroscience where there have been
great advances recently in understanding the processes
and mechanisms of innate behaviour such as sexual
behaviour, olfaction, sleep and touch.
3 System Logic
It is with this growth in the sophistication of systems
that we need to examine our foundations. Almost all
those engaged in systems theory ascribe to the under-
lying truism inherited from the time of the enlighten-
ment that to understand science is to understand it
formally. Of the various possible forms of formalism,
the best form must surely be the formalism of mathe-
matics. It is somewhat of a paradox that if we dig deep
enough into a foundation of mainstream scientists who
have regarded holism as a touch mystical, that the ta-
bles are turned. It is the mainstream itself that rests
on a foundation close to superstition. Eugene Wigner
the Nobel laureate in physics has epitomised this effect
by coining the phrase ’the unreasonable effectiveness
of mathematics’ [36] which was taken up and popu-
larised by the computer scientist and coding specialist
R W Hamming [15] so that it is a phrase oft quoted
by many scientists with approval.
Wigner himself described ‘the enormous usefulness
of mathematics in the natural sciences as something
bordering on the mysterious’ and adds ‘there is no
rational explanation for it’ ([36] at p 2). Hamming
goes further to make it ‘an act of faith on the part
of scientists that the world can be explained in the
simple terms that mathematics handles’([15] at p8).
Wigner’s stance seems to place current mathemati-
cal methods firmly alongside alchemy and astrology
where the basis of authority is superstition. If our
justification is no more than mathematics works then
it is superstition no more and no less than those who
still today trust their horoscope because it is justified
by their experience. The justification of Hamming for
mathematics is a little more sophisticated in that he
makes it a matter of faith. That is he replaces super-
stition with religion. However this only begs the ques-
tion in removing the issue one stage further away. This
does not assist us because it would require us to be
sure about the rationality of religion. In today’s terms
this would take us into further complicated questions
like ‘intelligent design’. Let us then keep within the
formal approach and be guided by Go¨del himself who
was able to prove his incompleteness of mathematics
using mathematics itself.
Wigner makes a very important second point: ‘it is
just this uncanny usefulness of mathematical concepts
that raises the question of uniqueness of our physical
theories’. However Wigner does not seek to answer
this second question because he claims the data is not
available. However it does give us a clue to assess
mathematics beyond number and axioms. The sub-
ject matter of mathematics is continuously evolving
usually driven by science and technology and Wigner’s
rather surprising attitude has even been extended to
logic itself as applied to computer science [14].
This justification that current methods work may
well be valid throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.
But the question now is can we be sure that they will
work as well for all the new sophisticated systems of
the 21st century and beyond. To answer we need to
have some appreciation of why they have worked in
the past. A highly desirable feature required for free
and open systems theory is exactness. As we shall see
below exactness can be formally defined but may be
informally interpreted as ’certainty’.
Probably the most rigorous path by which to ap-
proach certainty in logical foundations is through the
work of Kurt Go¨del that became a watershed in 20th
century logic. There are two key concepts in Go¨del’s
work which are components of ’certainty’ and these
are completeness and decidability. Go¨del’s 1929 doc-
toral thesis established that first-order predicate logic
is complete [8]. This was followed the next year by
his famous theorem of undecidability that applies to
any system depending on axiom and number 1. Go¨del
made three major contributions to logic that are very
pertinent to the scientific method of the twentieth cen-
tury. These are:
1. The system of first-order predicate (but not in-
tuitionistic [11; 12; 13]) logic is complete [8;
9].
2. Any formal system of number and/or sets derived
from axioms is undecidable [10].
3. Independence of the continuum hypothesis [3] 2.
1Go¨del treated natural numbers and sets as equivalent
because of the arithmetisation of sets [25]
2This is still an active research topic in proof theory
For such systems, cybernetic principles suggest a
logic that permeates all three ‘dimensions’ of formal
mathematics, empirical science and applied philoso-
phy as enunciated by Husserl ([21] p.159; [1]) where
just one or two on their own without all three together
are woefully insufficient.
4 Logico-Mathematics
Husserl as a pioneer of post-modernism is still of
interest today [2] but he wrote around the turn of
the twentieth century at the time when the logisti-
cal approach to mathematics was in vogue. Math-
ematics and logic had just been merged by Frege
and the fine detail was being hammered out rigor-
ously by Whitehead (1861-1947) and Russell (1872-
1970) in their Principia Mathematica [32] in the be-
lief that logic underpinned mathematics and there was
really no more to mathematics than logic. It was
at that same time around the 1900s, as Husserl [21]
was sowing the seeds of post-modernism, that David
Hilbert (1862-1943) was advancing the cause of the
formalist approach that mathematics was wholly reg-
ulated by the manipulation of formulae irrespective
of their meaning or interpretation. To this end he
was presenting a formal Programme (with 23 research
problems) of mechanical logico-mathematics for the
modern world. Difficulties were there from the out-
set like Russell’s paradox to raise doubts on the suf-
ficiency of both Frege’s axioms and Hilbert’s pro-
gramme but it was left to Go¨del in the early 1930s [9;
10; 11] by his two theorems of undecidability to dis-
prove the hope that any mechanistic axiomatic system
of logico-mathematical principles (as Go¨del referred to
them) based on number or sets could ever be found.
Husserl was also proved right because there were two
of his ’dimensions’ missing - the science and the phi-
losophy 3 4.
We cannot apply Go¨del’s results properly without
understanding logical foundations on which they are
based. Go¨del started with Russell and Whitehead’s
system [33].
The logico-mathematical basis for scientific reason-
ing is not clearly defined in mainstream work. If there
is any consensus it is to be found within the tradition
of Whitehead and Russell [33]. However, there is not
even a standard version of these principles. For an
analytical exposition of the principles of [33] it seems
best to rely on the version given by Kurt Go¨del. Be-
cause of the significance for all mathematical work
and particularly because of applied mathematics for
the rest of the twentieth century that rested on this
relevant to scientific method for the concept of infinity and
the meaning of an axiom [37].
3Go¨del himself started to study Husserl in 1959 and
subsequently recommends enthusiastically Husserl’s inves-
tigation VI of the elements of phenomenological elucida-
tion of knowledge in respect of categorial intuitions
4Go¨del’s self perception of his own social and intellec-
tual role [30] in the situation in Central Europe can be
gleaned from his replies to a sociology questionnaire in the
‘Grandjean interview’. See Wang ([31]).
foundation for reasoning itself, it is important to be
aware of the nature of these principles consisting of
formal axioms and rules of inference. Much if not
all twentieth century mathematical models in science
and engineering are postulated on them. They are
nowhere uniquely defined but a typical list is given by
Go¨del himself as the starting point of his own work.
He claims to rest on the propositions established by
Whitehead and Russell denoted as *1 and *10 in their
Principia Mathematica. Go¨del reduced these to just
eight axioms accompanied by four rules of inference
([8] p.67; [9] p.105). The four rules of inference are:
1. The inferential schema: from the truth of p∧p −→
q, there may be inferred q.
2. The rule of substitution for propositional and
predicate variables 5.
3. The inference for universal quantification of pred-
icates.
4. Individual free or bound variables may be re-
placed subject to scoping.
Whitehead and Russell themselves however point
out that there are many implied assumptions along
the way such as the meaning of truth and falsehood
and indeed the Principia is subject to tentative quali-
fications throughout the original work and even more
equivocation and variance is introduced in the later
second [33] and abbreviated edition [35]. There are
further alternative positions and qualifications put for-
ward by Russell himself in his philosophical discussion
of mathematics [27] and the book for the more gen-
eral reader of Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy
p.514 [29] 6.
A crucial principle in Whitehead and Russell’s sys-
tem of logic [33] is the Closed World Assumption with
only the two Boolean possible outcomes. The up-
shot of these foundational axioms is that inference is
defined only in terms of this Closed World Assump-
tion. It means that negation, conjunction and disjunc-
tion are not independent. Although not mentioned by
Go¨del because he treats as given the assumptions of
[33] nevertheless there are these fundamental defini-
tions of true and false which are assumed by White-
head and Russell. The first edition of the Principia
Mathematica tells us we have to accept the concepts
of truth, falsehood and the assumptions of the logical
sum, logical product, complementarity and implica-
tion ([33] 1st ed. p.6). The later writings suggest that
these four principles of deduction enumerated in [33]
could be represented alternatively by five propositions
([29] p.149-150) although they do not explicitly corre-
spond to those of Go¨del.
5Russell admits in footnote 1 p.151 [29] that no prin-
ciple of substitution is enunciated in [33] ’But this would
seem to be an admission’.
6There for example Russell picks up the point of CI
Lewis in three papers in (Mind xxi 1912 p.522-531; xxiii
1914 p.240-247) on ’formal deducibility’ as a narrower re-
lation than strict implication. This is an important issue
which leads to defeasibility [17], going further than the
discussion of intuitionistic logic discussed here.
The second edition of [33] recognises that the four
assumptions could be collapsed into one principle with
the use of the Schaeffer stroke where p | q is true if
p is true or q is true or p ∧ q is true, which is now
further developed in the NAND operation. White-
head & Russell [33] define as ‘material implication’
the concept ¬p ∨ q (See further Russell [28]).
The Closed World Assumption or to give it its older
Latin tag tertium non datur (there’s no third way) is
relied on by the Principia and those who depend on
its inference schema to define inference itself that is
the assertion of implication p −→ q from ¬p ∨ q. Sci-
entific models therefore that draw scientific inferences
are assuming the Closed World Assumption with all
its ramifications.
5 Logico-Science
As we have already seen to justify the use of scientific
models because they work only holds where it is close
to a first order model (which will then satisfy first or-
der predicate logic) and problems arising from Go¨del’s
theorems of undecidability can be avoided. The Sci-
entific method of the last three centuries has actually
achieved this by experimental verification. It is to be
noted that this only holds locally and it is the com-
pleteness of first order predicate logic that gives such
models their generality. For higher order and open
systems experimental verification only holds locally
without any guarantee of wider validity.
The paradigm of the scientific method is:
Theoretical model −→ Prediction −→ Experiment
−→ Validation
This model may well have been very adequate for the
19th century and it did lead to many ingenious and
successful methods for bringing non-linear and higher
order problems within first order models. This owes
much to the influential work of Jevons who promoted
a very general and weak concept of ’scientific induc-
tion’ ([22] Lesson XXVIII, p.239-247). Aristotle has a
full discussion on the subject of induction and as John
Maynard Keynes points out (1883-1946) it is Aristo-
tle’s first meaning of the Greek word ǫ`παγωγη´ as nat-
ural induction that is important, ’in which an abstract
notion is exemplified’ ([23] p.274).
In Figure 1(a) B ⊂ A and if by inference we mean
implication then A implies B. By the Closed World
Assumption C is the complement of A. However in
the real world system B is always part of its context
C unless it can be fully partitioned off as a closed
system. A full partitioning is not possible in practice
nor allowed by the laws of physics but this situation
can be represented by the open system. Figure 1(b)
shows the difference between the closed (full circle)
and the open (broken circle) situation. For a closed
A then the complement of the complement of A gets
back to closed A (i.e. classically ¬¬A = A) but for an
open A the complement of the complement of A gives
closed A not open A (classically ¬¬A 6= A). However
classically ¬¬¬A = ¬A even when A is open 7.
7This is an instance of the categorial principle that a
three-level operation always provides a closure [18].
Figure 1: (a) Classical Venn and (b) Open Venn Dia-
gram
The open system leads to the intuitionistic logic
of Brouwer. Go¨del himself was clearly exercised in
his mind by the work of Brouwer for he raised a
qualification on only the second page of the type-
script of his doctoral thesis ([8] p.60-61) referring
to Brouwer before proving that first-order predicate
logic is complete. Go¨del however omitted the refer-
ence to Brouwer in the published version of his the-
sis. Feferman suggests that this may have been on
the advice of his supervisor Hahn to omit Brouwer
who was a persona non grata with Hilbert. Neverthe-
less Go¨del went on to show in formal reasoning that
first-order intuitionistic logic is not complete [11; 12;
13] but did show exceptional insight into this logic.
Brouwer’s student Heyting was able to show that it
turns out very formally in the Heyting algebra [20]. It
is this gap between open and closed systems that pro-
vides the non-classical third way needed for all higher
studies including human affairs and socio-cybernetics.
The real world is not a closed system which is the other
side of the coin of constructivism and intuitionism.
6 Logico-Philosophy
We need therefore a basis for reasoning in the logic
and we need a basis for understanding the science of
socio-cybernetics in post-modern mathematics.
Husserl’s own work led indirectly to the develop-
ment of post-modernism in various artistic fields such
as Derrida in literature culminating in a new gen-
eral philosophic approach but not a formal one al-
though Husserl himself started from geometry. The
take-up for post-modernism in logic mathematics and
science has in general been slow. The most promis-
ing is the process philosophy of Whitehead [34]. The
logico-mathematical system alluded to above that be-
gan with Frege, was held out with great promise by
Hilbert, rigorously presented by Whitehead & Rus-
sell but ultimately demolished by Go¨del needs replac-
ing by a philosophy that is free of the Go¨del limita-
tions. Rather curiously the current prime promise to
meet the requirements was developed by Alfred North
Whitehead. This is process philosophy [34]. It ap-
pears that while Whitehead and Russell were collab-
orating on the Principia they had their doubts about
fundamental entities [18]. This leads to a formal phi-
losophy, but a metaphysics not a model as distin-
guished by Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) [4]. A model
suffers from Go¨del uncertainty which is the common
approach in theoretical computer science including ar-
tificial intelligence 8. The Church-Turing thesis and
recursive functions led to the von Neumann architec-
ture which is still dependent on Go¨del.
Category Theory provides a formal post-modern
mathematics and brings together algebra, geome-
try and topology. It is fully formal in its logico-
mathematical representation so far as it is based on
the empirical scientific principles for the particular
category known as cartesian closed and embodies this
philosophy of process as understood by Whitehead.
Category theory achieves and goes beyond the post-
modern mathematics sought by the Bourbaki French
School of Mathematics 9.
7 Category Theory
Category theory is based not on the set as a fun-
damental but on the concept of a morphism, gener-
ally thought of as an arrow and represented by −→.
The arrow represents the monoid of process whether
a dynamic operation or a static condition and can
cope therefore with descriptive/ prescriptive equiva-
lent views. The cartesian closed category exists in a
meta-physical sense with an instantiation of the struc-
ture of the real world both physical and social that we
can know empirically.
Conventionally a category is a collection of arrows
between objects which may be named corresponding
to a type. An object is any variable entity identified by
an identity arrow and some phenomenological datum.
The ordinary arrows of a category operate between
and relate distinguishable data. A category can then
be considered as a type or class of datum with opera-
tions between data 10. There is a recursive power to
category theory not available in set theory because of
the restrictive definition of set membership. A person
could be a category and then its objects and arrows
are characteristics of that person. On the other hand
there is a category of persons when the objects are
then individuals with the arrows providing the group
dynamics.
A functor relates one category to another: it is a
mapping between categories. In the example above
where a person is a category then a functor would
relate persons. Components of an information sys-
tem may be represented by categories A,B,C, . . . and
with the functors between the categories recognised
as knowledge. An arrow between functors is termed a
8For example in the use of agents [5; 6; 1].
9“Bourbaki’s rejection of categories was one of the most
significant points in the transformation of the group’s
spirit. For the first time, something that people knew to be
eminently Bourbakian was mostly rejected out of a desire
to advance without addressing .... the starting point.”([24]
p.84).
10An object in an object-oriented paradigm is not usu-
ally defined formally but seems to correspond to an object
in category theory.
natural transformation. If the objects are data, the
categories information and the functors knowledge,
then the natural transformations are wisdom, policy,
etc.
Because a category is defined up to natural isomor-
phism there is a natural closure for cartesian closed
categories at the level of a category of categories which
exists by virtue of the recursive power of categories
mentioned previously. A category of categories is
known as a topos and its great significance for the
context of sociocybernetics is that its internal logic is
the intuitionistic as represented formally by Heyting.
The real world as an interoperating open system is an
instantiation of the topos and in particular gives us a
formal description of how physical and social systems
interact.
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